Ghana and BRICS: A Strategic Choice, Not a Slogan

Ghana is broke in a very specific way. Not broke of resources. Broke of options. For years we have financed the state the same way. Eurobonds when markets are kind.

IMF programs when they are not. Loans with conditions attached. Each cycle ends the same. High borrowing costs. Currency risk. Debt that grows faster than the economy meant to service it. That is why Ghana joining BRICS matters. It is not about picking East over West. It is about getting a second financing door to walk through.

What BRICS Actually Is

BRICS began as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Today it is bigger. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE, Indonesia and others have joined or been invited.

Together they hold close to half the world population and more than a third of global GDP in purchasing power terms.

It was never a military alliance. It was economic. The complaint was simple. The global financial system still reflects the world after the Second World War. Voting power in the IMF and World Bank still favors the old powers. Dollar borrowing still punishes countries that earn in local currency but repay in dollars. BRICS offered choice.

Not a replacement overnight, but an alternative. It rests on three pillars.  The New Development Bank, which lends for infrastructure without the usual structural adjustment package. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement, a pool to help members manage shocks. And a push for trade in local currencies to reduce dollar dependence.

Members are expected to bring something. Market size. Resources. Regional influence. Stability. And to follow the club's quiet rule. Do not join to beg. Join to trade, to co-finance, to co-produce. We talk about BRICS as if membership alone is the prize. It is not. Membership is a platform. What you build on it is the prize.

What Members Have Actually Done

Look at what members did, not what they said. China used BRICS to secure markets and push infrastructure finance. India used it to protect policy space on food, energy and digital sovereignty. Brazil used it to push for global governance reform and open markets. South Africa used it to position itself as Africa's gateway.

Ethiopia and Egypt joined for infrastructure finance and a louder voice on debt. The pattern is clear. They did not join to export raw materials cheaper.

They joined to move up the value chain, negotiate better financing, and keep more value at home. Ghana has not done that yet. We still export gold, cocoa, bauxite, manganese and oil largely unprocessed. We sell cocoa beans and buy chocolate. We ship bauxite and import aluminium products. That is not a trade strategy. That is a leak. 

A Strategy Map for Ghana

A strategy map links what you have, to what you do, to what you get. If we want cheaper, more stable financing, we need credible assets to back it.

If we want credible assets, we need processed, certified, traceable products, not raw tonnage. If we want processed products, we need industrial policy that rewards processing. And for that to work, we need institutions investors trust. The old model is debt backed by promises.

The new model is debt backed by cash flows from real assets. Ghana produces over 1.1 million tonnes of plastic waste a year and over 800,000 tonnes of cocoa husk and pod residue. Today we call that waste.

In carbon markets, verified plastic recovery and biochar from cocoa waste can generate credits under Verra and Gold Standard. Those credits can be pooled, certified and securitized. The same logic applies to minerals.

Raw bauxite is a weak asset. Alumina with a verified offtake contract is stronger. Processed cocoa with traceability is stronger than a bag of beans. BRICS matters here because the New Development Bank is more likely than Eurobond buyers to finance this kind of asset-backed structure. They understand commodity transformation because they have done it themselves. 

What Ghana Should Actually Do

1. Process before we export, where it pays.

Ghana does not need an export ban. It needs an export upgrade. We sell raw and buy back finished. The value and the jobs leave with it. Start with two commodities where the business case already works. Cocoa husk and manganese. Tie export licences to a clear, published processing plan, with timelines and local jobs. Give processors a time-bound tax incentive tied to actual jobs and volume processed. If they process, they benefit. If they do not, the incentive stops. Over five years, shift the share. Less raw tonnage out. More processed value out.

2. Create a Ghana Sovereign Asset Vehicle.

A bankruptcy-remote vehicle, state-owned but independently governed. It would pool verified carbon credits and future flows from processed minerals, and issue securities against them. A partial guarantee from the New Development Bank would lower the yield far below an Eurobond. Pilot it small. 100 million dollars. Verifiable. Published.

3. Make certification a national asset.

Ghana cannot sell what it cannot prove. The Ghana Carbon Market Office should be a one-stop shop, not a bottleneck. Cap verification fees and subsidize aggregators for the first three years.

4. Negotiate with a list, not a request.

Offer refined cocoa to India and China. Offer processed bauxite to the UAE and Brazil. Offer carbon credits to the New Development Bank. In return, ask for local currency swaps, technology transfer, and co-financing for processing parks in Takoradi and Tema.

5. Tie licenses to local value.

Every new mining or processing license should carry three conditions. A processing plan. A skills transfer plan. A community benefit agreement published online. This is not anti-investor. Good investors prefer clarity to favoritism.

None of these means leaving the IMF or World Bank. Strategy is about options, not enemies. Ghana has spent decades exporting raw materials and importing debt. BRICS will not fix that by itself. But if we use membership to change what we sell, how we finance, and what we keep at home, we may finally negotiate from strength, not from need. That is the real test. Not whether we join. But whether we arrive prepared.

The writer is a Senior Lecturer at University of Professional Studies, Marketing Department 

                                                           Sompaonline.com/Dr. Ebenezer Arthur Duncan